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Abstract 13 
The relation between attention and consciousness is a highly debated topic in Cognitive 14 
Neuroscience. Although there is an agreement about their relationship at the functional level, 15 
there is still no consensus about how these two cognitive processes interact at the neural level. 16 
According to the gateway hypothesis (Posner, 1994), attention filters the information 17 
accessing to consciousness, resulting in both neural and functional modulations. Contrary to 18 
this idea, the cumulative influence hypothesis (Tallon-Baudry, 2012) proposes that both 19 
attention and consciousness independently impact decision processes about the perception of 20 
stimuli. Accordingly, we could observe an interaction between attention and consciousness at 21 
the behavioral level, but not at the neural level. Previous studies have shown that alerting and 22 
orienting networks of attention modulate participants’ ability to verbally report near-threshold 23 
visual stimuli both at behavioral and neural levels, supporting the gateway hypothesis over the 24 
cumulative influence hypothesis. The impact of the executive control network of attention on 25 
conscious perception, however, has only been explored behaviorally (Colás et al., 2017). In 26 
the present study, we employed high-density encephalography to investigate the neural basis 27 
of the interaction between executive attention and conscious perception. We presented a 28 
classical Stroop task concurrently with a detection task of near-threshold stimuli. In two 29 
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separate sessions, we manipulated the proportion of congruent and incongruent Stroop 30 
stimuli. We found that the Stroop-evoked N2 potential (usually associated to conflict 31 
detection and localized in the anterior cingulate cortex) was modulated by both conflict 32 
detection and conscious perception processes. These results suggest that the relation between 33 
executive control and conscious perception lies in frontal lobe regions associated to conflict 34 
detection, supporting the gateway hypothesis over the cumulative influence hypothesis.  35 
Highlitghts: 36 
 Executive control and consciousness interact at the behavioral and neural level.  37 
 The conflict-related N2 component discriminates between seen and unseen targets. 38 
 The N2 component was associated to activation of the anterior cingulate cortex. 39 
Keywords: executive control; conscious perception; proactive and reactive control; 40 
proportion congruent; ERP; source localization. 41 
42 
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1. Introduction 43 
 We can only report a small portion of the information reaching our senses, but how 44 
this information is selected is still an open question in Cognitive Neuroscience. Attention has 45 
been proposed as the selection mechanism that filters the access of visual information into 46 
consciousness (Bartolomeo, 2008; Dehaene et al., 2006; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; 47 
Posner, 1994). Dehaene and colleagues (Dehaene et al., 2006, 2003; Dehaene and Changeux, 48 
2004; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001) suggest that the extent to which a certain stimulus gains 49 
access to conscious processing depends not only on (bottom-up) stimulus strength but also on 50 
top-down attentional amplification. This idea follows the Global Neuronal Workspace model 51 
(Baars, 2005, 2002) of conscious access, which states that to be consciously perceived (and 52 
therefore accessible to higher order cognitive functions such as memory, language, and 53 
action-planning) the neural representation of sensory information has to propagate to 54 
distributed large-scale networks in the global neuronal workspace. The model emphasizes the 55 
hierarchical organization of the brain, separating lower automatized and specialized systems 56 
from the supervisory executive system (Dehaene and Changeux, 2004). Other models also 57 
highlight the importance of attentional amplification for conscious perception (Petersen and 58 
Posner, 2012; Posner and Petersen, 1990), proposing attention as the gateway to 59 
consciousness.  60 
The use of neuroimaging techniques in paradigms comparing conscious and 61 
unconscious processing of information has identified some key nodes in the frontal and 62 
parietal cortices that seem to be critically involved in conscious perception (for  reviews, see 63 
Aru et al., 2012; Chica and Bartolomeo, 2012; De Graaf et al., 2012; Dehaene and Changeux, 64 
2011). Given that the neural ignition of long-distance networks in the brain appears crucial for 65 
conscious perception, we could assume that changes in brain activity preceding the 66 
presentation of information also play an important role in conscious processing. In fact, 67 
existing evidence corroborates that conscious access can be predicted by pre-stimulus 68 
activation (Mathewson et al., 2009; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2009). Accordingly, 69 
fluctuations in attention before stimulus presentation should modulate conscious perception. 70 
The relation between attention and conscious perception has already been explored in 71 
the literature. Based on Petersen and Posner’s theoretical model (Petersen and Posner, 2012; 72 
Posner and Petersen, 1990), attention can be divided into three functionally and anatomically 73 
distinct networks: alertness, orienting, and executive control. Behavioral studies have 74 
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demonstrated that phasic alertness and exogenous spatial attention improve the conscious 75 
perception of visual stimuli (Chica et al., 2012, 2011; Kusnir et al., 2011; Petersen et al., 76 
2017). However, interactions between both attentional systems and conscious perception 77 
occur through segregated brain networks. The interaction between phasic alerting and 78 
conscious perception is mediated through a fronto-striatal network including the anterior 79 
cingulate cortex, the supplementary motor area, the caudate, and the frontal eye-fields (Chica 80 
et al., 2016). The interaction between spatial attention and conscious perception is instead 81 
associated to the activity of the left frontal eye field, the bilateral superior and inferior parietal 82 
lobes, and the right inferior frontal gyrus (Chica et al., 2013). 83 
Recently, interference control was demonstrated to modulate the conscious perception 84 
of near-threshold stimuli, making participants’ decision criterion more conservative after 85 
incongruent as compared to congruent Stroop trials (Colás et al., 2017). Interference control is 86 
one of the three core components of executive function, that could be equivalent to executive 87 
control, as it enables us to attend selectively, focusing on some features or stimuli while 88 
suppressing attention to others (Diamond, 2013; Petersen and Posner, 2012). The present 89 
study addresses for the first time the neural mechanisms underlying the modulation of 90 
conscious perception by interference control. According to the cumulative influence 91 
hypothesis (Tallon-Baudry, 2012), the frontal lobes play an key role on the decisional stage of 92 
verbally reporting consciously perceived information. It is proposed that the information of 93 
attentional and perceptual systems is analyzed in different and independent brain networks, 94 
being integrated within the frontal lobe for decision-making (decision about reporting the 95 
stimulus presence or absence). Contrary, both the Global Neural Workspace model (Baars, 96 
2005, 2002; Dehaene et al., 2006) and the gateway hypothesis (Petersen and Posner, 2012; 97 
Posner, 1994) state that attentional amplification should modulate conscious access in the 98 
prefrontal-parietal network. Therefore, attentional recruitments in conflict trials should result 99 
in a neural interaction (likely in frontal regions) between interference control and conscious 100 
perception.  101 
We conducted an electroencephalography (EEG) study adapting the paradigm used in 102 
Colás et al. (2017), which combined a typical Stroop-task (with congruent and incongruent 103 
stimuli) with a conscious detection task of near-threshold stimuli (in which stimuli were 104 
individually titrated to achieve ~50% consciously reported Gabors). Both tasks were 105 
presented in a concurrent manner, so that trials could be sorted into congruent-seen, 106 
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congruent-unseen, incongruent-seen, and incongruent-unseen. Participants conducted two 107 
separate sessions; in one of them, 75% of the Stroop trials were congruent and 25% of the 108 
trials were incongruent, a manipulation known to prompt reactive control due to the low 109 
expectancy of interference (Botvinick et al., 2001; Braver, 2012; De Pisapia and Braver, 110 
2006). In the other session, 25% of the Stroop trials were congruent and 75% of the trials 111 
were incongruent, increasing the recruitment of proactive control as a consequence of the high 112 
expectancy of interference (Botvinick et al., 2001; Braver, 2012; De Pisapia and Braver, 113 
2006). Following the dual mechanisms framework of control (Braver, 2012; De Pisapia and 114 
Braver, 2006), individuals can either rely on a reactive strategy of cognitive control, activated 115 
only after conflict detection, or employ a proactive control strategy which is maintained 116 
through the block of trials. The recruitment of these two mechanisms of control can depend 117 
on task contingencies or individual differences, or can just wax and wane spontaneously 118 
during a block of trials (Kalanthroff et al., 2014). 119 
We analyzed the anterior N2 component locked to the appearance of the Stroop word, 120 
a component that has been related to conflict solving (Folstein and Van Petten, 2008; Luck, 121 
2012). We expected an overall enhanced N2 component when the Stroop word was 122 
incongruent as compared to congruent trials, due to interference control recruitment. We 123 
hypothesized that this difference would be larger when participants had to implement reactive 124 
control (on incongruent trials from the high proportion congruent session), because according 125 
to the dual mechanisms framework (Braver, 2012; De Pisapia and Braver, 2006), proactive 126 
control would be maintained across both congruent and incongruent trials in the low 127 
proportion congruent session. In addition, we conducted source-localization analyses, and we 128 
expected the N2 component to be localized in the anterior cingulate cortex (Van Veen and 129 
Carter, 2002). Moreover, if the interaction between interference control and conscious access 130 
was supported at the neural level, the N2 component should differentiate between consciously 131 
perceived and non-perceived near-threshold stimuli. We hypothesized an interaction between 132 
interference control and conscious perception, expecting a larger N2 component for 133 
incongruent seen as compared to incongruent unseen trials, especially in the high proportion 134 
congruent session. Results from this study will show for the first time the when and where of 135 
the neural basis of the interaction between interference control and the conscious perception 136 
of near-threshold stimuli. 137 
2. Methods 138 
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2.1. Participants 139 
Twenty-six students from the University of Granada (Spain) gave their signed 140 
informed consent to participate in the study in exchange of course credit. Five participants did 141 
not attend the second session of the study and were removed from the analyses. Therefore, 142 
data from twenty-one participants (3 men; mean age of 21 years, SD = 3.69) were included 143 
for the behavioral analyses. For the ERP analyses, data from four further participants were 144 
excluded because, after applying artifact detection tools, they had less than 15 trials per 145 
condition. The study was approved by the Human Ethical Committee from the University of 146 
Granada, in compliance with the ethical standards of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. 147 
2.2. Apparatus and stimuli 148 
E-prime software (Schneider et al., 2002) was used for the presentation of stimuli and 149 
behavioral data collection. Experiments were conducted using a 17” DELL monitor running 150 
at 85Hz. Participants sat at approximately 57 cm from the screen. Two black markers and a 151 
centered fixation point (a black plus sign, 0.3° × 0.3°) were displayed at the beginning of each 152 
trial. The markers consisted of a black square outline (6° width × 4.5° height), placed 8° to 153 
either the left or the right side of the fixation point (distance measured from the center of the 154 
fixation point to the center of the lateral marker). Spanish words for blue (azul, 1.5° × 0.5°), 155 
green (verde, 2° × 0.5°), and yellow (amarillo, 4° × 0.5°) colors were presented 1° above 156 
fixation. Words were presented either in blue, green, or yellow ink, and could make a given 157 
trial congruent (when word meaning and ink color matched) or incongruent (when word 158 
meaning and ink color did not match). Inside the lateral markers, a Gabor stimulus could 159 
appear. Matlab 8.1. (http://www.mathworks.com) was used to create 100 Gabor stimuli (4 160 
cycles/deg. spatial frequency, 2.5° in diameter, SD of 0.3°), with a maximum and minimum 161 
Michelson contrast of 0.92 and 0.02, respectively. 162 
2.3. Procedure 163 
Figure 1 shows the timing and sequence of events in a given experimental trial. The 164 
duration of the fixation display varied randomly between 1008 and 1752 ms. The Stroop word 165 
was then presented for 492 ms, and the Gabor stimulus (lasting 36 ms) appeared 252 ms after 166 
the word onset. Participants could respond to the Stroop word from the moment it was 167 
displayed and for a maximum period of 2016 ms (word duration plus 1524 ms). After that, 168 
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participants were required to respond to the Gabor detection task, with no time limit. An inter-169 
stimulus interval of 2508 ms was set after the Gabor response, allowing participants to blink 170 
and prepare for the next trial.  171 
 172 
Figure 1. Timing and sequence of events in a given experimental trial (left). Electrode distribution around the 173 
scalp (right; the top of the figure represents the frontal area). Additional sites according to the 10–20 174 
international system are shown for further reference. 175 
Participants were required to perform two consecutive tasks. First, they had to 176 
discriminate the word’s ink color as fast and accurately as possible. Participants responded 177 
with their right hand, pressing a keyboard key for each given color (the color-key mapping 178 
was counterbalanced across participants). On 12% of the trials no word was presented and no 179 
response was required. Then, participants performed the Gabor detection task, reporting if 180 
they had perceived its appearance. They were asked to respond accurately and without time 181 
pressure, reporting the Gabor location only when they were confident about their perception. 182 
The response was given by choosing one of two arrow-like stimuli (>>> or <<<), pointing to 183 
the two possible locations of the Gabor: right and left sides of the screen. The arrows were 184 
presented one above the other, with their position randomized in each trial. Participants 185 
indicated the location of the Gabor with their left hand, pressing an upper keyboard key 186 
corresponding to the upper arrow, or a lower key corresponding to the bottom arrow. This 187 
response procedure was employed in order to minimize response preparation and 188 
anticipations (Chica et al., 2011). Participants were asked to press the space bar whenever 189 
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they had not perceived the stimulus. No Gabor was presented on 19% of the trials (catch 190 
trials). 191 
Before the experimental trials, participants passed through a titration procedure, where 192 
Gabor contrast was calibrated for each participant in the absence of the Stroop stimulus. 193 
During titration, participants had to detect the Gabor and select its location. Titration began 194 
with a supra-threshold stimulus (Michelson contrast = 0.184), which contrast was 195 
manipulated based on the mean percentage of seen Gabors every 16 trials. If participants 196 
reported 63% or more Gabors during the last block of trials, Gabors at the immediately 197 
following lower contrast level (Michelson contrast minus 0.009) were used during the next 198 
block of trials; however, if the percentage of seen Gabors was equal or lower than 38% during 199 
the last block of trials, the next block of trials presented Gabors at the immediately following 200 
higher contrast level (Michelson contrast plus 0.009). The titration procedure stopped when 201 
Gabor contrast yielded a percentage of seen targets >38% and <63% for two consecutive 202 
blocks of 16 trials. 203 
Participants completed two separate sessions, each containing titration, practice (15 204 
trials), and experimental trials. In one of the sessions, congruent trials were more frequent 205 
than incongruent trials (75% congruent trials - 25% incongruent trials; high proportion 206 
congruent session), whereas in the other session, incongruent trials were more frequent than 207 
congruent trials (75% incongruent trials - 25% congruent trials; low proportion congruent 208 
session). The order of the sessions was counterbalanced across participants. The experiment 209 
consisted of a total of 1088 experimental trials (544 trials per session, divided in 4 210 
experimental blocks of 136 trials). Therefore, a total of 360 congruent trials and 120 211 
incongruent trials were presented in the high proportion congruent session (no Stroop word 212 
was presented in the remaining 64 trials). In the low proportion congruent session, the 213 
proportion of congruent and incongruent trials reversed, giving a total of 360 incongruent 214 
trials, 120 congruent trials, and 64 trials in which the word was not presented. Each session 215 
contained a total of 96 Gabor catch trials (trials in which the Stroop word was presented in 216 
absence of the Gabor stimulus). Participants were allowed to take a short break after every 68 217 
trials. Additionally, after every 136 trials, the experimenter checked the impedance of the 218 
electrodes to try and keep it below 50 KΩ. 219 
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2.4. EEG signal recording and analysis 220 
The analysis of the EEG signal at the sensor level was performed using the Net Station 221 
software package (https://egi.com/). After preprocessing the EEG signal, event-related 222 
potentials locked to the Stroop word were analyzed. 223 
Source-level analysis was performed using the FieldTrip software package 224 
(Oostenveld et al., 2011; http://www.ru.nl/fcdonders/fieldtrip/) and in-house Matlab code. Its 225 
aim was to identify the neural generators underlying the N2 component modulations. 226 
2.4.1. Sensor level analysis 227 
EEG was recorded using a high-density 128-channel Geodesic Sensor Net (Tucker et 228 
al., 1994; see Figure 1). The head-coverage included sensors lateral to and below both eyes to 229 
monitor horizontal and vertical eye movements (HEOG and VEOG). Impedances for each 230 
channel were measured and kept below 50 KΩ before testing. All electrodes were referenced 231 
to the Cz electrode during recording and were re-referenced to the average of all electrodes 232 
off-line. The EEG signal was acquired at a sampling rate of 250 Hz. It was band-pass filtered 233 
online between 0.1 and 100 Hz using an elliptic filter, and subsequently filtered offline by 234 
using a 0.3–30 Hz band-pass Butterworth filter. Epochs were segmented from 200 ms before 235 
the presentation of the Stroop word to 450 ms after its appearance. A 200 ms segment prior to 236 
the Stroop word presentation was used to calculate the baseline. Trials containing eye blinks 237 
or eye movements (electro-oculogram channel differences greater than 70 V) or trials with 238 
more than 20% of bad channels were rejected. Overall, a total of 22% of the trials were 239 
rejected due to artifacts or to anticipatory responses. Data from four participants were 240 
excluded because after applying artifact detection tools, less than 15 trials per condition 241 
remained. Word-related ERP analyses were performed over the following mean total of trials: 242 
for the high proportion congruent session, congruent-seen (137), congruent-unseen (94), 243 
incongruent-seen (40) and incongruent-unseen (29); for the low proportion congruent session, 244 
congruent-seen (44), congruent-unseen (35), incongruent-seen (125) and incongruent-unseen 245 
(109). 246 
2.1.2. Source level analysis 247 
The localization of brain sources was carried out by means of beamforming (Gross et 248 
al., 2001; Van Veen et al., 1997). Source localization was performed on a standard MRI in 249 
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MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) space provided by the EEGLAB toolbox 250 
(https://sccn.ucsd.edu/eeglab/), which was segmented into 12-mm resolution voxels. The 251 
forward model was computed using a standard boundary element method (BEM) volume 252 
conduction model (Oostenveld et al., 2003) and standard electrode positions. Lead fields were 253 
calculated for the 3 possible orientations of each voxel. We computed the spatial filter 254 
coefficients by means of linearly constrained minimum variance beamformer (LCMV; Van 255 
Veen et al., 1997). In order to obtain the filter coefficients, the single-trial covariance matrix 256 
was calculated for 444 ms segments corresponding to the time window after the Stroop word 257 
presentation, as well as 200 ms from the baseline period. Regularization (lambda parameter) 258 
was set to 10%, i.e. a unit matrix scaled to 10% of the mean across eigenvalues of the 259 
covariance matrix was added to it. Subsequently, each sensor-level trial was projected into 260 
each voxel of source-space through the spatial filter corresponding to the optimally oriented 261 
dipole. Source-level trials were averaged for the different conditions separately, thus 262 
obtaining the corresponding source-level ERPs. To avoid differences in amplitude due to 263 
voxels depth, source-level ERPs were all normalized as relative change with respect to the 264 
root mean square of the baseline activity for each voxel (Capilla et al., 2013). Finally, we 265 
averaged the brain activation results across subjects and identified the voxels exhibiting 266 
absolute spatial maxima/minima in the time window of the ERP component of interest (i.e. 267 
N2 component).  268 
3. Results 269 
3.1. Behavioral results 270 
Data from twenty-one participants were included in the behavioral analyses. 271 
Participants perceived an average of 54% of the trials (SD= 13%). The mean rate of false 272 
alarms was 4.1% (SD= 6.4%). Mean Gabor contrast (averaged contrast levels used during the 273 
experiment for each participant) was not different in the high proportion congruent session 274 
and the low proportion congruent session, t(20)= -0.05, p=.95. 275 
We firstly analyzed mean accuracy and reaction times (RTs) to respond to the Stroop 276 
task. We performed two independent analyses of variance (ANOVA), with the within 277 
participants factors of proportion congruency (high proportion congruent and low proportion 278 
congruent sessions), congruency (congruent and incongruent Stroop trials), and awareness 279 
(near-threshold Gabors reported as “seen” or “unseen”).  280 
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Second, we analyzed responses to the Gabor detection task to explore participants’ 281 
conscious perception of the Gabor and its modulation by interference control. We analyzed 282 
participants’ responses by using the signal detection theory, which provides a measure of 283 
perceptual sensitivity (d’) and response criterion (beta). The indexes were calculated by 284 
computing participants’ hits or correct detections (when participants accurately determined 285 
the location of a presented Gabor, i.e. “seen” Gabors), misses (trials in which the Gabor was 286 
presented but participants did not consciously report it, i.e. “unseen” Gabors), false alarms 287 
(when participants consciously reported Gabors that were not presented), and correct 288 
rejections (trials in which the Gabor was not presented and participants reported not having 289 
seen it). Trials in which participants incorrectly reported the location of a present Gabor were 290 
considered errors and removed from the analyses (1.83% of presented Gabors). Trials in 291 
which participants pressed any key before the presentation of the Gabor detection response 292 
display were considered anticipations and removed from the analyses (0.22% of the trials in 293 
which Gabors were presented). Trials in which participants committed an error in the Stroop 294 
task were also excluded from the Gabor detection task analyses (9.77% of the remaining 295 
trials). After eliminating Gabor detection errors and Stroop trial errors, a mean of 947 trials 296 
(SD=66) per participant were included in the analyses. 297 
Perceptual sensitivity (d’) and response criterion (beta) were calculated with the 298 
following equations: d’ = z(H) − z(FA); β = Yz(H) Yz(FA)⁄ . H represents the hit rate, FA 299 
represents the false alarm rate, and z corresponds to z-scores, which were calculated using the 300 
inverse cumulative distribution function in Microsoft Excel 2011 (NORMSINV). The Y-score 301 
corresponds to the normal distribution function in Microsoft Excel 2011. Zero false alarm 302 
rates were corrected using the equation proposed by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988): FA =303 
(FA + 0.5) (FA + CR + 1)⁄ . For d’, larger values indicate an increased perceptual sensitivity 304 
(more hits and/or less false alarms). Beta = 1 indicates a non-biased criterion; the higher the 305 
beta value, the more conservative the criterion (fewer hits and/or fewer false alarms), and the 306 
smaller the beta value, the less conservative the criterion (more hits and/or more false alarms). 307 
Mean d’ and beta indexes were submitted to two repeated measures ANOVAs with the 308 
within participants factors of proportion congruency (high and low proportion congruent) and 309 
congruency (congruent and incongruent). For all analyses, post-hoc Fisher tests were used to 310 
further explore the interactions. 311 
3.1.1 Stroop task 312 
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The analysis of the mean RTs demonstrated a main effect of congruency, F(1, 313 
20)=53.06, p<.001, ηp2 =.73, with shorter RTs for congruent than for incongruent trials (see 314 
Table 1). As expected, this congruency effect was modulated by proportion congruency, F(1, 315 
20)=34.43, p<.001, ηp2 =.63. Although the congruency effect was significant for both sessions 316 
(both ps < .001), the effect was larger in the high proportion congruent session as compared 317 
with the low proportion congruent session. None of the other main effects or interactions were 318 
significant (all ps >.10).  319 
Table 1. Mean RTs (in ms) and accuracy in the Stroop task, with standard errors in parenthesis, as a function of 320 
proportion congruency (high and low proportion congruent session), congruency (congruent and incongruent 321 
trial), and awareness (Gabors reported as “seen” or “unseen”). 322 
 
High proportion congruent 
75% congruent – 25% incongruent 
Low proportion congruent 
25% congruent – 75% incongruent 
Congruent trial Incongruent trial Congruent trial Incongruent trial 
Seen Unseen Seen Unseen Seen Unseen Seen Unseen 
Mean RT 649 (35) 639 (27) 768 (53) 771 (39) 617 (31) 619 (28) 663 (31) 663 (27) 
Mean accuracy .93 (.02) .92 (.02) .85 (.03) .81 (03) .93 (.02) .89 (.02) .89 (.02) .87 (.02) 
The analysis of the mean accuracy in the Stroop task demonstrated a main effect of 323 
congruency, F(1, 20)=29.85, p<.001, ηp2 =.60, which significantly interacted with proportion 324 
congruency, F(1, 20)=9.88, p=.005, ηp2 =.33. Participants were more accurate in congruent 325 
trials as compared with incongruent trials in the high proportion congruent session (p<.001). 326 
In the low proportion congruent session, the congruency effect did not reach significance 327 
(Fisher post-hoc test, p=.07). A main effect of awareness was also observed, F(1, 20)=14.61, 328 
p=.001, ηp2 =.42, demonstrating that participants were more accurate in the Stroop task in 329 
trials where they also perceived the Gabor stimulus as compared with trials in which the 330 
Gabor was missed (see Table 1). None of the other main effects or interactions reached 331 
statistical significance (all ps >.10). 332 
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3.1.2 Gabor detection task 333 
The interaction between proportion congruency and congruency was not significant 334 
for the d’ index, F(1, 20)=2.56, p=.12, ηp2 =.11, but it reached statistical significance for the 335 
beta index, F(1, 20)=9.14, p=.007, ηp2 =.31. Response criterion was comparable for 336 
incongruent trials in the high and low proportion congruent sessions (p=.478), while a more 337 
conservative criterion was observed for congruent trials in the low proportion congruent 338 
session as compared with the high proportion congruent session (p<.001) (see Table 2). 339 
Within the low proportion congruent session, response criterion to detect the Gabor was more 340 
conservative for congruent trials as compared with incongruent trials (p=.014). The reversed 341 
pattern was observed in the high proportion congruent session, although it did not reach 342 
statistical significance (p=.131). No other main effects or interactions reached statistical 343 
significance (all ps >.08 for d’, and all ps >.21 for beta). 344 
Table 2. Mean percentage of hits, false alarms, d’, and beta to detect the near-threshold Gabor (with standard 345 
errors in parenthesis), as a function of proportion congruency (high and low proportion congruent session) and 346 
congruency (congruent and incongruent trial). 347 
 
High proportion congruent 
75% congruent – 25% incongruent 
Low proportion congruent 
25% congruent – 75% incongruent 
Congruent trial Incongruent trial Congruent trial Incongruent trial 
Mean hits .57 (.03) .56 (.03) .55 (.03) .53 (.03) 
Mean FA .05 (.02) .06 (.02) .03 (.02) .03 (.01) 
Mean d’ 2.14 (.17) 2.13 (.20) 2.42 (.18) 2.18 (.16) 
Mean beta 10.22 (1.75) 13.53 (2.34) 20.72 (2.02) 15.05 (2.34) 
3.2. EEG results 348 
Seventeen participants were included in the EEG analyses. Behavioral results from 349 
these participants showed the same main effects and interactions as the results described 350 
above.  351 
We analyzed the event-related potentials (ERPs) locked to the appearance of the 352 
Stroop word. Within each session (high proportion congruent and low proportion congruent), 353 
we set up 4 conditions based on congruency of the Stroop word (congruent and incongruent 354 
Stroop trials) and awareness of the Gabor (targets reported as “seen” or “unseen”). Visual 355 
inspection of Stroop-related ERPs in both sessions revealed three main components (see 356 
Figure 2). We firstly observed a P1 component (peaking at 120 ms) in parieto-occipital 357 
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electrodes. This component was followed by a left lateralized parieto-occipital negativity, the 358 
N1 component (peaking at 190 ms). Finally, we observed a negative N2 component in left-359 
lateralized frontal electrodes, peaking at 320 ms. 360 
 361 
Figure 2. Topography maps for components P1, N1, and N2 for the high proportion congruent session (upper 362 
panel) and the low proportion congruent session (lower panel). 363 
We calculated the mean amplitude of P1 (time window from 100 to 140 ms after the 364 
Stroop word onset), N1 (time window from 160 to 220 ms), and N2 (time window from 260 365 
to 360 ms) for each participant in a sample of representative electrodes from the 10-20 366 
electrode system (O1/O2, P3/P4, T5/T6, Pz, T3/T4, C3/C4, electrodes 21/25 representing F3 367 
and electrodes 119/124 representing F4, electrodes 11/12/5 representing Fz, F7/F8) (see Chica 368 
et al., 2012). To determine the scalp location where each component was maximally elicited, 369 
we performed a one-way ANOVA for each component, with electrode as a factor. For all 370 
components, the main effect of electrode was significant (all ps < .05). The P1 component 371 
was larger in P3/P4 electrodes (M= .88 µ), followed by the Pz electrode (M= .34 µ). These 372 
two amplitudes were statistically different (post-hoc planned comparisons, p = .01), therefore, 373 
we only included electrodes P3 and P4 in the P1 analysis. The largest mean amplitude of the 374 
N1 component was observed in electrodes O1/O2 (M= −1.61 µ), followed by electrode T5 375 
(M= −1.60 µ). These two amplitudes did not differ statistically (post-hoc planned 376 
comparisons, p = .99). The N2 component was larger in Fz electrode (M= -2.16 µ), followed 377 
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by left-lateralized electrodes F3 (M= -2.03 µ) and F7 (M= -1.92 µ). These amplitudes did not 378 
differ statistically (Fisher post-hoc test, all ps > .64). T3 amplitude did not differ from the Fz, 379 
F7and F3 electrodes, but this electrode was not included in the analysis because the anterior 380 
N2 component (sensitive to the violation of expectations and conflict detection) has been 381 
associated to frontal and central electrodes rather than to temporal electrodes (Folstein and 382 
Van Petten, 2008; Luck, 2012).  383 
3.2.1 Mean amplitude analyses 384 
We analyzed the modulation of each component for each experimental condition by 385 
calculating its mean amplitude (20 ms before and 20 ms after the higher peak) at the 386 
electrodes where each component was maximally elicited (P3/P4 electrodes for the P1 387 
component, electrodes O1/O2 and T5 for the N1 component, and electrodes F3, F7, and Fz 388 
for the N2 component).  389 
The ANOVAs for the P1 and N1 components, with the factors of proportion 390 
congruency, congruency, and awareness, did not show any significant main effects or 391 
interactions (all ps > .10).  392 
For the N2 ANOVA, a main effect of awareness was observed, F(1,16)= 7.30, p = 393 
.016, ηp2 = .31. N2 was enhanced for seen as compared with unseen trials. This effect was 394 
mediated by an interaction between proportion congruency, congruency, and awareness, 395 
F(1,16)= 11.17, p = .004, ηp2 = .41 (see Figure 3). In the high proportion congruent session, 396 
incongruent trials elicited a larger N2 for seen as compared with unseen trials (Fisher post-hoc 397 
test, p=.04). Although not significant, the effect reversed for congruent trials (p=.13). In the 398 
low proportion congruent session, by contrast, seen trials elicited an overall larger N2 399 
component than unseen trials, although the effect was only significant for congruent trials 400 
(p=.001; p=.35 for incongruent trials).  401 
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 402 
Figure 3. N2 component amplitude for electrodes F3, F7, and Fz as a function of congruency and awareness for 403 
the high proportion congruent session and the low proportion congruent session. The y-axis represents the 404 
amplitude of the wave (in V). The x-axis represents time, with the value 0 corresponding to the onset of the 405 
Stroop word. In the high proportion congruent session, N2 amplitude was enhanced for incongruent seen trials as 406 
compared with incongruent unseen trials. In the low proportion congruent session, N2 amplitude was enhanced 407 
for seen as compared to unseen trials for both congruency conditions, although the effect only reached 408 
significance for congruent trials. 409 
3.2.2 Source-location analyses 410 
 We first compared the neural sources underlying the N2 component for congruent and 411 
incongruent trials in the high proportion congruent and the low proportion congruent sessions 412 
(see Figure 4). Overall, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which has been related to conflict 413 
detection and conflict monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2004, 2001; Carter et al., 1999), showed 414 
more activation for incongruent as compared to congruent Stroop trials. While the activation 415 
of the ACC was observed for incongruent trials but not for congruent trials in the high 416 
proportion congruent session, the ACC was activated for both incongruent and congruent 417 
trials in the low proportion congruent session. This observation is in agreement with the dual 418 
mechanisms of control framework (Braver, 2012; De Pisapia and Braver, 2006).  419 
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 420 
Figure 4. Medial view of the brain sources with maximum percent relative change in activation for the N2 421 
component. Greater values (and/or warmer colors) represent greater brain activity in those areas during the N2 422 
time window, expressed as percent relative change respect to the baseline (pre-stimulus) period. Left panel 423 
shows the brain sources for the N2 component for the high proportion congruent session, whereas right panel 424 
shows the brain sources for the low proportion congruent session. Congruent trials are represented in the upper 425 
panel and incongruent trials in the bottom panel. The red ellipse indicates the location of the anterior cingulate 426 
cortex (ACC). 427 
We then observed the activation of the ACC as a function of awareness, congruency, 428 
and proportion congruency (see Figure 5). In the high proportion congruent session, the ACC 429 
was activated for seen but not for unseen Gabors, but only when trials were incongruent. In 430 
the low proportion congruent session, the ACC was activated for seen but not for unseen 431 
Gabors both on congruent and incongruent trials. 432 
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 433 
Figure 5. Medial view of the brain sources with maximum percent relative change in activation for the N2 434 
component in the high proportion congruent session (left) and the low proportion congruent session (right) as a 435 
function of congruency and awareness. Greater values (and/or warmer colors) represent greater brain activity in 436 
those areas during the N2 time window, expressed as percent relative change respect to the baseline (pre-437 
stimulus) period. The red ellipse indicates the location of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). 438 
4. Discussion 439 
The present study addressed for the first time the neural mechanisms underlying the 440 
interference control modulation of conscious perception. We explored whether the behavioral 441 
interaction between interference control and conscious perception found in Colás et al. (2017) 442 
reflected a neural interaction in the N2 component, associated to conflict resolution (the 443 
anterior N2 component, Folstein and Van Petten, 2008; Luck, 2012), usually localized in 444 
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fronto-central electrodes and corresponding to neural activity in the ACC (Van Veen and 445 
Carter, 2002). The finding of this interaction is hypothesized by the attentional gateway 446 
hypothesis (Petersen and Posner, 2012; Posner, 1994), while the cumulative influence 447 
hypothesis (Tallon-Baudry, 2012) predicts that interference control and conscious perception 448 
mechanisms could be dissociated at the neural level.  449 
The experimental paradigm employed allowed us to manipulate interference control as 450 
a mental task-set, prompting the recruitment of either reactive or proactive control 451 
mechanisms (in the high and low proportion congruent sessions, respectively) (Braver, 2012; 452 
De Pisapia and Braver, 2006). Moreover, the manipulation of congruent and incongruent 453 
Stroop trials allowed us to analyze the experienced trial-by-trial conflict. We registered 454 
participants’ reports on the conscious perception of a near-threshold Gabor that was presented 455 
simultaneously to the Stroop stimulus, exploring the neural correlates of interference control 456 
and conscious perception through EEG recordings. If attention and conscious perception 457 
separately influenced decision-making concerning the perception of a stimulus, as proposed 458 
by the cumulative influence hypothesis (Tallon-Baudry, 2012), ERPs evoked by Stroop word 459 
would not differ between trials in which the near-threshold Gabor was consciously perceived 460 
as compared to trials in which the Gabor was not consciously perceived. Conversely, if 461 
attention and conscious perception interacted at the neural level, as suggested by the gateway 462 
hypothesis (Petersen and Posner, 2012; Posner, 1994), we would expect to observe 463 
differences in the ERPs evoked by the Stroop word for trials in which Gabors were 464 
consciously perceived as compared to trials in which Gabors were not consciously perceived.  465 
The ERP results demonstrated an effect of conscious perception in the generation of 466 
the N2 component, which is assumed to reflect the operation of a conflict detection system 467 
(Luck, 2012; Yeung et al., 2004). This component demonstrated an interaction between 468 
congruency and awareness that was modulated by proportion congruency. As expected, N2 469 
was enhanced for incongruent-seen trials as compared to incongruent-unseen trials in the high 470 
proportion congruent session. This result seems to indicate that when exerting reactive control 471 
(in the high proportion congruent condition), the detection of conflict on a given trial is 472 
associated to the conscious perception of near-threshold stimuli. In the low proportion 473 
congruency session (in which proactive control is thought to be maintained through the 474 
block), N2 was overall enhanced for seen as compared to unseen trials, although the effect 475 
was only significant for congruent trials. These results suggest that the modulation of the N2 476 
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component is related to interference control, elicited especially by incongruent trials from the 477 
high proportion congruency condition, but it is also associated to the frequency of trials in 478 
each session (the N2 modulation was more pronounced for incongruent Stroop trials from the 479 
high proportion congruent session and congruent Stroop trials from the low proportion 480 
congruent session). This observation is consistent with previous literature reporting that the 481 
N2 component is sensitive to the mismatch between an expectation and a stimulus (Luck, 482 
2012). This expectation mismatch, which could easily be elicited by infrequent Stroop stimuli 483 
in our experimental paradigm, has also been observed to evoke ACC activity (Downar et al., 484 
2000; Kiehl et al., 2001a, 2001b).  485 
Source localization analyses confirmed that the ACC was one of the most activated 486 
brain regions in the time window of the N2 component. As expected, ACC activation was 487 
observed for incongruent but not for congruent trials in the high proportion congruent session 488 
(when reactive control was required), but ACC was activated for both congruent and 489 
incongruent trials in the low proportion congruent session, maybe indicating the recruitment 490 
of proactive control strategies (Braver, 2012; De Pisapia and Braver, 2006). Consistent with 491 
the ERP data, in the high proportion congruent session, ACC was activated for seen but not 492 
for unseen Gabors only for incongruent trials (in which reactive control is required). In the 493 
low proportion congruent session, ACC was activated for seen but not for unseen Gabors both 494 
for congruent and incongruent trials. This result suggests that the activation of the ACC is 495 
related both to conflict detection and the conscious perception of near-threshold information. 496 
The Global Workspace model posits the importance of frontal lobe regions in conscious 497 
perception (Baars, 2005, 2002; Dehaene et al., 2006), although evidence supporting their 498 
specific role is scarce. Our data add empirical evidence to the implication of frontal lobe 499 
functions in both interference control and conscious perception, supporting the predictions of 500 
the gateway hypothesis.  501 
Unexpectedly, we did not observe a main effect of congruency in the N2 component. 502 
Although the type of mechanism of control recruited (reactive vs proactive control) did not 503 
modulate the N2 wave by itself, source localization analysis demonstrated that ACC activity 504 
was elicited by both congruent and incongruent Stroop trials from the low proportion 505 
congruent session. In line with these results, previous neuroimaging studies have shown that 506 
both congruent and incongruent Stroop trials can trigger higher ACC activations as compared 507 
with neutral trials (Bench et al., 1993; Carter et al., 1995). Recent studies (Goldfarb and 508 
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Henik, 2007; Kalanthroff et al., 2013; MacLeod and MacDonald, 2000) have demonstrated 509 
that Stroop tasks entangle two types of conflict: informational conflict (the conflict elicited by 510 
the relevant –word color– and the irrelevant –word meaning– dimensions of the stimuli) and 511 
task conflict (the conflict elicited by the relevant –identifying the ink color– and the irrelevant 512 
–reading the word– tasks). Although informational conflict would only be triggered by 513 
incongruent Stroop stimuli (as there is a mismatch between the information from the two 514 
dimensions of the stimulus), task conflict would be elicited by both incongruent and 515 
congruent Stroop stimuli. Therefore, task conflict could account for the activation of the ACC 516 
on congruent trials from our Stroop task.  517 
Some authors have also tested information and task conflict in situations prompting 518 
reactive or proactive mechanisms of control (Entel et al., 2014; Kalanthroff et al., 2014, 519 
2013). For example, Kalanthroff and colleagues demonstrated that the reduced access to 520 
proactive control mechanisms, prompted by a concurrent task of high working memory load, 521 
led to a larger task conflict (Kalanthroff et al., 2014), producing both interference (larger RTs 522 
for incongruent Stroop trials as compared with neutral Stroop trials, reflecting information 523 
conflict) and reverse facilitation (larger RTs for congruent Stroop trials as compared with 524 
neutral Stroop trials, indicative of task conflict). Thus, it is likely that our Stroop stimuli 525 
triggered both information and task conflict due to fluctuations of control strategies employed 526 
in the low proportion congruent situation (where proactive control is most likely to be 527 
elicited), and therefore recruiting ACC activation on both congruent and incongruent trials in 528 
that session. This more generalized ACC activation (affecting both congruent and incongruent 529 
trials) in the low proportion congruent condition as compared with the high proportion 530 
congruent condition could also be indicative of the use of proactive control strategies, which 531 
are thought to be maintained through the block of trials (Braver, 2012; De Pisapia and Braver, 532 
2006). 533 
The neural modulations described in this study could account for the observed 534 
behavioral modulation of response criterion after conflict detection in Colás et al. (2017). 535 
Contrary to our expectations, however, the results from the present study did not completely 536 
replicate our previous findings. In the previous study, we observed response criterion 537 
modulations in situations where reactive control mechanisms were more likely to be recruited 538 
(high proportion congruent session). We did not find, nor expected, modulations of conscious 539 
perception in situations where proactive control was implemented, i.e. the low proportion 540 
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congruent session. Data from the present study challenges our interpretation of the previous 541 
results, supposing that changes of response criterion were only observed in the high 542 
proportion congruent condition due to the higher amount of conflict that was triggered in 543 
incongruent trials from the high proportion congruent session, in opposition to incongruent 544 
trials from the low proportion congruent session (for a review of proportion congruent effects, 545 
see Bugg and Crump, 2012). Analyses of accuracy and RTs in the Stroop task suggest that the 546 
conflict effect in the high proportion congruent session was in fact greater than the conflict 547 
effect in the low proportion congruent session. However, in the present study the conflict-548 
related N2 component was modulated by conscious perception in both the high and low 549 
proportion congruent sessions, indicating an expectancy-related form of conflict. 550 
Importantly, the experimental design used in the present study varied substantially 551 
from the previous one. Specifically, in the first study we manipulated proportion congruency 552 
between participants, as opposed to the present within-participants manipulation. That is, 553 
participants from the ERP study performed both the high proportion congruent and the low 554 
proportion congruent sessions in a counterbalanced order, whereas participants from the 555 
previous study carried out only one of the mentioned sessions. Moreover, participants from 556 
the previous study also performed another less demanding session where the Gabor detection 557 
task and the Stroop task were presented in a sequential manner. Those differences could have 558 
influenced participants’ preferences for reactive or proactive control mechanisms, 559 
confounding our findings by increasing individual differences in implementing different 560 
mechanisms of control (Braver, 2012; Gonthier et al., 2016) or adopting different control 561 
strategies in each study. Moreover, the previous experiment did not control for intra-562 
individual variability in the implementation of control strategies (due to affective-563 
motivational factors or cognitive individual differences; Braver, 2012), as it was conducted in 564 
a between-participants design. More research is needed to replicate those findings controlling 565 
for these sources of variability in order to address the necessary and sufficient conditions in 566 
which executive control impacts participants’ response criterion in conscious detection tasks.  567 
In summary, the results of the present experiment demonstrated that conscious 568 
perception is associated to an amplitude modulation of the N2 component. Therefore, the 569 
generation of a conflict related potential, known to be implicated in situations of stimuli 570 
competition or expectations’ mismatch, is also associated to conscious perception of near-571 
threshold information. If, as proposed by the cumulative influence hypothesis (Tallon-Baudry, 572 
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2012), attention independently influenced participants’ perceptual decision making, we would 573 
not have expected to find differences between consciously perceived and non-perceived 574 
Gabors in a component associated to the conflict detection system, neither that this effect was 575 
modulated by our manipulations of congruency and proportion congruency.  576 
One could argue that those differences in N2 amplitude could be related to the 577 
consequences of conscious access, such as the phenomenological experience, working 578 
memory maintenance, or metacognitive processes about the perception of the stimulus. 579 
However, it is important to consider that this effect appeared 260-360ms after the presentation 580 
of the Stroop stimulus, not after the to-be detected near-threshold Gabor. A more plausible 581 
explanation, taking into account the timing of presentation of the stimuli, is that in situations 582 
of large conflict, greater N2 component amplitudes indicate a better preparation to detect and 583 
solve the conflict, allowing the top-down amplification of information giving rise to 584 
conscious perception. This interpretation is in line with the predictions of the gateway 585 
hypothesis (Petersen and Posner, 2012; Posner, 1994) and the Global Neuronal Workspace 586 
models on consciousness (Dehaene et al., 2006, 2003; Dehaene and Changeux, 2004; 587 
Dehaene and Naccache, 2001), according to which executive attention modulates conscious 588 
perception through the top-down amplification of stimulus-evoked activity in sensory areas. 589 
Importantly, the interaction between interference control and conscious perception was 590 
associated to a neural interaction between both mechanisms in the anterior N2 component, 591 
localized in the anterior cingulate cortex. 592 
593 
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